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11 Introduction
What is the effect of different labour unionisation structure on innovation? This issue
is gaining popularity in recent years due to the diversity of unionised labour markets
across countries.1 The effects of firm-specific labour unions are compared to that of
an industry-wide labour union. Under firm-specific labour unions, a firm deals with
a labour union that is associated with that firm, whereas under an industry-wide
labour union, the labour union deals with all firms in that industry.
In a patent race model, Haucap and Wey (2004) show that if an industry-wide
labour union charges a uniform wage to all firms, the incentive for a labour-saving
innovation is higher under an industry-wide labour union. However, if the industry-
wide labour union can charge different wages to different firms, the incentive for
innovation is higher under firm-specific labour unions. In a model with R&D
competition, Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) show that the incentive for a
labour-saving innovation is higher under firm-specific labour unions for non-drastic
innovations, while the incentive for innovation can be higher under an industry-wide
labour union for drastic innovation. Manasakis and Petrakis (2009) show that, under
non-cooperative R&D, the incentive for a labour-saving innovation is higher under
firm-specific labour unions if knowledge spillover is high, but the incentive for
innovation is always higher under firm-specific labour unions under cooperative
R&D. They also show that welfare is higher under firm-specific unions than under
an industry-wide labour union. Considering an innovating firm and a non-innovating
firm, Mukherjee and Pennings (2011) show the implications of technology licensing
ex-post innovation and the unions’ preferences for wage compared to employment in
determining the effects of the unionisation structure on a labour-saving innovation.
Although the above mentioned papers provide important insights, they all consider
perfectly substitutable workers, while it is often found that labour unions exist for
workers providing complementary services. For example, as mentioned in
Aghadadashli and Wey (2015, p. 667), in Germany, “[…] hospital doctors are
mainly represented by the Marburger Bund (a craft union), while the remaining
workers are represented by the German Trade Union (Verdi). […] The Deutsche
Bahn (the dominant railway operator) must bargain with the German Train
Drivers Union (Gewerkschaft Deutscher Lokomotivführer; GDL) and the Railway
and Transport Union (Eisenbahn- und Verkehrs-gewerkschaft; EVG). […] the
GDL is a craft union, which is complementary to workers represented by the
EVG. The former takes care of the train drivers’ employment conditions, and the
latter represents the remaining railway workers’ interests. […] Other examples
include airlines (where pilots are represented by Vereinigung Cockpit) and
airports (where air traffic controllers are organized in the Gewerkschaft der
Flugsicherung).” Hence, employers’ are exposed to the unions representing
complementary workers.
1 See, e.g., Calmfors and Drifill (1988), Moene and Wallerstein (1997) and Flanagan (1999) for the
difference in labour unions with respect to the degree of wage setting centralisation. Decentralised
wage setting is often contrasted with centralised wage setting. Under a decentralised wage setting,
wages are set between employers and firm-specific unions, while under a centralised wage setting, an
industry-wide union negotiates wages with all firms (Haucap and Wey, 2004).
2Different workers organised under different labour unions can be observed in other
countries also. For example, different types of workers are organised in different
unions in Sweden (see, e.g., Kjellberg, 2014, for a detailed discussion on the labour
unionisation structure in Sweden).
Upmann and Müller (2014) also provide evidence for labour unions with
complementary workers and different types of wage bargaining, viz., separate wage
bargaining, where different labour unions with different types of workers bargain
separately with firms, and wage bargaining by an encompassing labour union, where
an union bargain with firms for all types of workers. There are also other evidences
showing that wages set by the unions can be applicable to the entire industry. For
example, as mentioned in Haucap et al. (2001, p. 288), “a common feature of
many labor market systems in continental Europe are coverage extension rules.
Under these rules, the coverage of collectively negotiated wage contracts can be
extended to entire industries through legal means. With coverage extension, some
or all employment terms are made generally binding not only for the members of
unions and employers’ associations, but for all industry participants. In Germany,
for example, collective wage agreements between a union and an employers’
association can be made compulsory even for independent employers through the
so-called Allgemeinverbindlicherkla¨rung (AVE), a legal instrument provided for
in §5 Tarifvertragsgesetz (TVG). The Ministry of Labor can, on application of
either unions or employers’ associations, use an AVE to make some or all terms
of a collectively negotiated employment contract generally binding for an entire
industry, where otherwise only those unions, employers and employers’
associations that have actually negotiated and signed the contract would be
directly bound by it (§3 I TVG).” They also provide evidence for the coverage
extension rules in other countries and mention that the number of AVEs increased
from 448 in 1975 to 588 in 1998. Venn (2009) provides the evidence of
bargaining between the employers and the employees at the industry level for the
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. The evidence of industry-wide wage
bargaining can be found also in Carluccio et al. (2015) for France and in
Lamarche (2013) for Argentina.
Given this background, the purpose of this paper is to show the effects of
cooperation among the labour unions of complementary workers on innovation and
welfare.2 In what follows, in a model with an innovating and multiple non-innovating
firms, we show in Section 2 that an encompassing labour union of complementary
workers may decrease (increase) the incentive for innovation compared to separate
labour unions if the technological improvement through innovation is large (small).
Hence, our analysis follows the literature considering competition between innovating
and non-innovating firms (see, e.g., Mookherjee and Ray, 1991, Gallini, 1992, Ray
Chowdhury, 1995, Mukherjee, 2003, Mattoo et al., 2004 and Mukherjee and
Pennings, 2004). We show in Appendix A.7 that our result holds even if there are
multiple but not all innovators.
2 Although we consider the input suppliers as labour unions, our analysis is applicable if the input
suppliers are profit maximising firms charging linear input prices.
3As discussed in the following analysis, the “raising rival’s cost”3 motive may
explain why an encompassing union (compared to separate unions) may either
increase or decrease the incentive for innovation. Under the raising rival’s cost
motive a firm can take an action that increases the costs of its competitors. Even if
that action increases the cost of the concerned firm, the competitors’ cost increase
can be significantly more compared to its own cost increase, and on the balance,
this action helps the concerned firm to increase its profit by acquiring a larger
market share. We show that innovation by a firm may either increase or decrease
the marginal costs of the non-innovating firms. If innovation reduces the marginal
costs of the non-innovating firms, it benefits the non-innovating firms and may
discourage the innovator to innovate a new technology in order to raise the cost of
its rival. Although this effect remains under both encompassing and separate
unions, the raising rival’s cost motive is stronger under the former than the latter
since an encompassing union (compared to separate unions) benefits the innovator
from a lower marginal cost by reducing the complements problem discussed
below.
We also show that although an encompassing union reduces wage compared to
separate unions, it may make the consumers and the society worse off by reducing
innovation. While an encompassing union makes the workers better off compared
to separate unions, it may not make all final goods producers better off.
Our paper contributes to the literature following Horn and Wolinsky (1988),
Shapiro (2000), Mukherjee and Pennings (2011), Upmann and Müller (2014) and
Aghadadashli and Wey (2015). Shapiro (2000) shows that while choosing the
prices of complementary inputs non-cooperatively, input suppliers do not internalise
the negative external effects of their pricing on other complementary input
suppliers’ revenues, thus creating the complements problem.4 Cooperation among
the complementary input suppliers solves the complements problem and reduces
the input prices, thus increasing the profits of the input suppliers and making the
consumers better off by reducing the prices of the final goods. We show that
although cooperation among the complementary input suppliers (labour unions in our
case) reduces the input price (wage in our analysis) by solving the complements
problem, it may create a negative impact by reducing innovation. If the latter effect
dominates the former, cooperation among the complementary workers may not benefit
the consumers and the society.
Our framework is similar to the ‘no technology licensing’ case of Mukherjee and
Pennings (2011) with the exception that we consider complementary workers instead
of substitutable workers. It follows from Mukherjee and Pennings (2011) that, in the
absence of technology licensing, a final goods producer’s incentive for innovation is
higher under cooperation among the unions of substitutable workers. In contrast,
cooperation among the unions in our analysis may either increase or decrease
innovation. This difference is attributable to the different effects of cooperation among
the labour unions on wage.
3 See Williamson (1968), Salop and Scheffman (1983 and 1987) and Haucap et al. (2001) for some
earlier papers explaining the raising rival’s cost effect.
4 This is also called “royalty stacking” (Gilbert and Katz, 2011).
4Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Upmann and Müller (2014) and Aghadadashli and Wey
(2015) consider the effects of cooperation among labour unions with
complementary workers. Horn and Wolinsky (1988) show that the workers are
better off (worse off) under cooperation among the unions if the workers are
substitutable (complements). In contrast, we show that complementary workers can
be better off under cooperation. This difference occurs, since unlike them but like
other papers mentioned above, we allow the firms to determine workers after wage
determination. Further, unlike Horn and Wolinsky (1988), we consider product-
market competition among the final goods producers and show the effects of
cooperation among the unions on innovation and welfare, which is our main focus.
Both Aghadadashli and Wey (2015) and Upmann and Müller (2014) consider that
a firm and two labour unions bargain over wage and employment, thus
considering “efficient bargaining” model, and show that an encompassing labour
union makes complementary workers worse off compare to separate unions. In
contrast, like all other papers mentioned above, we consider a “right-to-manage”
model where the unions (or bargaining between the firms and the unions)
determine wage and the firms determine employment.5 Hence, the bargaining
structure considered in our paper is different from theirs. Further, unlike them, we
consider product-market competition and the effects through innovation. We show
that an encompassing labour union makes the complementary workers better off.
We also show the effects of different unionisation structure on innovation and
welfare, which is our main focus.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and derives the results. Section 3 discusses the implications of some of our
assumptions. Section 4 concludes. We relegate many mathematical details in the
Appendix.
2 The model and the results
Assume that there are one innovating firm (firm 1) and (n – 1) non-innovating
firms (firms 2,...,n), where 2n  . These firms compete like Cournot oligopolists
with homogeneous goods, facing the inverse market demand function 1P q  ,
where P is price and q is the total output. Production of the final goods requires
two types of workers, x and y, which are unionised. We assume that the workers x
and y are perfect complements. The reservation wages of all workers are c, which
are normalised to zero for simplicity. We consider a “right-to-manage” model of
labour unions where the unions determine the wages and the firms hire workers
according to their requirements.
Like Horn and Wolinsky (1988), we consider two types of labour unions: First,
separate labour unions, where union X (resp. under union Y) organises workers of
type x (resp. type y) and the unions determine wages xw and yw simultaneously
to maximise their own utilities. Second, an encompassing labour union, where a
single union organises both types of workers and determines wages xw and yw
5 See, Layard et al. (1991) for arguments in favour of the right-to-manage models.
5simultaneously to maximise the total utilities of all workers. We assume that an
encompassing union can charge different wages for different types of workers but
it charges the same wage to different firms for the same type of worker. Charging
the same wage to different firms for the same type of workers is in line with many
previous works such as Haucap and Wey (2004), Manasakis and Petrakis (2009)
and Mukherjee and Pennings (2011), and can be motivated by the empirical
evidence cited in the introduction for industry-wide wage bargaining.
To start with, we assume that all firms require one unit of each type of worker
to produce one unit of the final good. However, the innovating firm, firm 1, can
invest k amount in R&D to reduce its labour coefficients for both workers to s ,
where 1s  . Hence, to show our results in the simplest way, we consider that
innovation is not biased towards any type of worker and creates a neutral
technological progress.6 Thus, innovation increases labour productivities in firm 1
from 1 to 1/ s . It is intuitive that if s is very large, the non-innovating firm would
go out of the market. In order to ensure that all final goods producers always hire
workers, we assume that 2 / ( 2)n s  (see Appendix A.1 for details). Hence, we
consider that (2 / ( 2),1)s n  . We consider the binary choice for firm 1’s R&D
decision for analytical convenience. As we discuss below, our main result holds
even if firm 1 chooses the extent of technological improvement through R&D.
We consider the following game. Conditional on the unionisation structure, at
stage 1, firm 1 decides whether or not to innovate. At stage 2, wages are
determined by the unions. At stage 3, the final goods producers (firms 1,...,n)
determine their outputs simultaneously, and the profits are realised. We solve the
game through backward induction.
2.1 Separate labour unions
If the separate unions X and Y charge xw and yw as wages for workers x and y
respectively, firm 1 and the ith firm, i=2,...,n, determine their outputs by
maximising the following expressions respectively:
1
1[1 ( )]x yqMax q t w w q f   
[1 ( )]
i
x y iq
Max q w w q   ,
where, 1t  and 0f  under no innovation by firm 1, and t s and f k under
innovation by firm 1.
The equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and the ith firm, i=2,...,n, can be found as
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It is clear from (1) that a lower wage decreases the output of firm 1, i.e., 1q , if
( 1) /n nt  . Since, in our analysis, the profit of firm 1 is equal to 21( )q f , a
lower wage decreases the profit of firm 1 for ( 1) /n nt  .
6 We discuss the implications of this assumption in Section 3.
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Unions X and Y determine their wages by maximising the following expressions:
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The equilibrium wages are
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If 1t  , the equilibrium wages fall as the number of firms (i.e., n) increases.7 If
1t  , more firms increase the elasticity of demand for workers and reduce the
equilibrium wages.
We obtain from (1) and (2) that the equilibrium outputs of firm 1 and firm i,
i=2,...,n, are
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The equilibrium profits of firm 1 and firm i, i=2,...,n, are  
2
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LEMMA 1 Under separate labour unions, firm 1 innovates for
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PROOF See Appendix A.2. Q.E.D.
The expression nck shows firm 1’s maximum willingness to pay for innovation
under separate unions. Innovation increases firm 1’s product-market profit
compared to no innovation. However, innovation also imposes a cost on firm 1.
Hence, firm 1 innovates if the cost of innovation is not very high.
7 We get that 2 2
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72.2 An encompassing labour union
If the encompassing union charges xw and yw as wages for workers x and y
respectively, the equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 are given by (1) and the
demand for workers is given by 1
2
n
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i
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
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by maximising the following expression:
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Like separate unions, we get under an encompassing union that, if 1t  , as the
number of firms (i.e., n) increases, the elasticity of demand for workers increases
and the equilibrium wages fall.8
We obtain from (1) and (3) that the equilibrium outputs of firm 1 and firm i,
i=2,...,n, are
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PROOF See Appendix A.3. Q.E.D.
The expression ck shows firm 1’s maximum willingness to pay for innovation
under an encompassing labour union. The intuition for Lemma 2 is similar to that
of Lemma 1.
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82.3 Comparison between separate and encompassing labour unions
2.3.1 The effects of an encompassing labour union on wage and the final goods
producers
The comparison of (2) and (3) gives the following result immediately.
PROPOSITION 1 Wages are higher under separate labour unions than under an
encompassing labour union, irrespective of firm 1’s R&D decision.
Since the workers are complements, an encompassing labour union reduces
wages compared to separate unions, thus solving the complements problem and
reducing the marginal costs of all final goods producers compared to separate
labour unions.
Since the encompassing labour union reduces the marginal costs of all final
goods producers compared to separate unions, it is immediate that if firm 1 does
not innovate (i.e., 1t  ), it increases the profits of all final goods producers
compared to separate unions. However, as we will show below, this may not be
the case if firm 1 innovates.
PROPOSITION 2 If firm 1 innovates, an encompassing labour union decreases
(increases) the profit of firm 1 compared to separate labour unions for
(2 / ( 2),( 1) / )s n n n   ( (( 1) / ,1)s n n  ) but it increases the profits of other
final goods producers.
PROOF See Appendix A.4. Q.E.D.
Although an encompassing union (compared to separate unions) reduces the
marginal costs of all final goods producers, the marginal cost saving is higher for
the non-innovators compared to the innovator. It follows from the discussion
made after (1) that a lower wage reduces the output and profit of firm 1 if
( 1) /s n n  . Hence, if the technological difference between the innovator and
the non-innovators is large (i.e., (2 / ( 2),( 1) / )s n n n   ), the marginal cost
saving under an encompassing union (compared to separate unions) is
significantly higher for the non-innovators compared to the innovator, thus
reducing the profit of the innovator under an encompassing union.
2.3.2 The effect of an encompassing labour union on innovation
PROPOSITION 3 If *(2 / ( 2), )s n s  ( *( ,1)s s ), where
* 2 2 4(3 4 7 9 58 49 ) / 4s n n n n n      , an encompassing labour union
decreases (increases) firm 1’s incentive for innovation compared to separate
labour unions for ( , )c nck k k ( ( , )nc ck k k ).
9PROOF See Appendix A.5. Q.E.D.
The reason for the above result is as follows. Firm 1’s incentive for innovation
depends on the difference in its profit between innovation and no innovation. On
one hand, an encompassing union (compared to separate unions) tends to reduce
firm 1’s incentive for innovation by increasing its profit under no innovation. On
the other hand, an encompassing union (compared to separate unions) tends to
increase (decrease) firm 1’s incentive for innovation by increasing (decreasing) its
profit under innovation if its technological improvement through innovation is
small (large). It follows from the discussion made after (1) that firm 1’s profit
reduces (increases) with a lower wage if ( )( 1) /s n n   . Hence, if firm 1’s
technological improvement through innovation is large, both the above-mentioned
effects reduce firm 1’s incentive for innovation under an encompassing union
compared to separate unions. However, if firm 1’s technological improvement
through innovation is small, the above-mentioned second effect can dominate the
first effect, and an encompassing union can increase firm 1’s incentive for
innovation.
The above discussion suggests that the “raising rival’s cost”9 motive is behind
the result shown in Proposition 3. Innovation by firm 1 reduces its marginal cost
but it may either increase or decrease the marginal costs of the non-innovating
firms. If s is sufficiently small (i.e., *s s ), innovation by firm 1 reduces the
marginal costs of the non-innovating firms, implying that firm 1 cannot capture
the entire benefit from innovation, which benefits also the non-innovating firms.
Hence, the raising rival’s cost motive may discourage firm 1 from innovating if s
is sufficiently small. Although this effect remains under both encompassing and
separate unions, the effect is stronger under the former than the latter unionisation
structure since an encompassing union benefits firm 1 from a lower marginal cost
compared to separate unions. Hence, firm 1’s motive for raising the rival’s cost is
higher under an encompassing union than under separate unions, and its incentive
for innovation is lower under an encompassing union than under separate unions
if s is sufficiently small.
The above argument suggests that competition in the product market may play
an important role for the innovation reducing effect of an encompassing union. In
other words, an encompassing union may not reduce firm 1’s incentive for
innovation compared to separate unions if firm 1 is a monopolist producer of the
product. We show that this is indeed the case. It is easy to check that if 1n  ,
* 2 / ( 2)s n  , implying that the range *(2 / ( 2), )n s is empty. Hence, an
encompassing union does not reduce firm 1’s incentive for innovation compared
to separate unions if firm 1 is a monopolist producer of the product.
In the above analysis, we have considered an innovator and (n – 1) non-
innovators to show the innovation reducing effect of an encompassing union in
the simplest way. We show in Appendix A.7 that this result holds if there are
multiple but not all innovators. If all firms innovate under an encompassing union,
9 See Salop and Scheffman (1983 and 1987) for earlier works explaining the raising rival’s cost
effect.
10
we show in Appendix A.7 that the encompassing union does not reduce innovation
compared to separate unions. This happens since the “raising rival’s cost” effect
mentioned above is absent in this situation.
We have done our analysis under the assumption that the unions set the same
wage to different firms, which gets significant support from the empirical
evidence. If the unions set different wages to different firms, the incentive for
innovation is higher under an encompassing union than under separate unions,
again due to the absence of the “raising rival’s cost” effect.
2.3.3 The effect of an encompassing labour union on the total output
It follows from Propositions 1 and 3 that an encompassing union has two
opposing effects on the total outputs. On one hand, it tends to reduce wages, and
on the other hand, it may reduce innovation by firm 1. The following proposition
shows that, depending on the extent of firm 1’s technological improvement
through R&D, an encompassing union may either increase or decrease the total
outputs produced by all firms, thus may have an ambiguous effect on consumer
surplus.
PROPOSITION 4 Assume that *(2 / ( 2), )s n s  and ( , )c nck k k . An
encompassing labour union decreases (increases) the total outputs of the final
goods producers compared to separate labour unions for **(2 / ( 2), )s n s 
( ** *( , )s s s ), where
2 2 4
** *
2
( 4 3 3( ))
2 / ( 2)
( 4 3 )
n n n n
n s s
n
     
   
 
.
PROOF See Appendix A.6. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 suggests that although an encompassing labour union creates the
beneficial wage effect, which solves the complements problem, its adverse effect
on firm 1’s innovation may dominate the beneficial wage effect, thus reducing the
total outputs of the final goods producers under an encompassing union compared
to separate unions. Since consumer surplus in our analysis is 2 / 2q , the above
result implies that an encompassing labour union makes the consumers worse off
compared to separate unions if the technological improvement through R&D is
large.
Proposition 3 shows that an encompassing union increases firm 1’s incentive
for innovation for *( ,1)s s and nc ck k k  . In this situation, the total outputs of
the final goods producers are lower under “separate labour unions with no R&D
by firm 1” compared to that of under “an encompassing labour union with R&D
by firm 1”, implying that consumer surplus is higher under an encompassing
union than under separate unions. The positive wage effect as well as the positive
innovation effect helps to reduce the marginal costs of final goods production,
thus making the consumers better off under an encompassing union.
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We have considered a binary choice for firm 1’s R&D decision (i.e., firm 1
innovates or doesn’t innovate). As a result, firm 1 may not innovate under an
encompassing union if the technological improvement through R&D is not small.
However, no innovation by firm 1 under an encompassing union is an extreme
situation and is the artefact of the binary choice. If firm 1 could choose the extent
of technological improvement through R&D, say, by investing 2(s) / 2F s to
reduce its labour coefficient by s, it would innovate under an encompassing union
but the extent of technological improvement could be lower under an
encompassing union compared to separate unions. Hence, even if firm 1’s R&D
decision is not a binary choice and firm 1 can choose the extent of technological
improvement, the adverse effect of an encompassing union on firm 1’s innovation
remains, which, in turn, may also make the consumers worse off under an
encompassing union compared to separate unions.10 The consideration of a binary
choice for firm 1’s R&D decision helps us to prove our point in the simplest way.
2.3.4 The effect of an encompassing labour union on the union utilities
So far, we have done the analysis under separate and encompassing unions.
However, it is important to see whether the workers have the incentive to form an
encompassing union.
The utilities of the unions are
2
2
( 1 )
9( 1)[ 2(1 ) (2 2 )]
nc nc
x y
n t
n t n t t
 
 
 
     
and
2
2
( 1 )
8( 1)[ 2(1 ) (2 2 )]
c c
x y
n t
n t n t t
 
 
 
     
under separate unions and an encompassing union respectively. It is immediate
that if firm 1 either innovates or does not innovate irrespective of the unionisation
structure, the utilities of the unions are higher under an encompassing union than
under separate unions.
Now consider the situation where firm 1 innovates under separate unions but it
does not innovate under an encompassing union, which occurs for
*(2 / ( 2), )s n s  and c nck k k  . In this situation, the utilities of the unions are
2
, ,
2
( 1 )
9( 1)[ 2(1 ) (2 2 )]
nc rd nc rd
x y
n s
n s n s s
 
 
 
     
and
c, c,
8( 1)
nrd nrd
x y
n
n
  

under separate unions and an encompassing union respectively. Straightforward
comparison shows that the union utilities are higher under an encompassing union
than under separate unions in this situation.
10 The intuition follows from Marjit and Mukherjee (2008), which shows in a different context that
an input price reduction may either increase or decrease investment in innovation.
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Finally, consider the case where firm 1 innovates under an encompassing union
but it does not innovate under separate unions, which occurs for *( ,1)s s and
nc ck k k  . In this situation, the utilities of the unions are
, ,
9( 1)
nc nrd nc nrd
x y
n
n
  

and
2
c, c,
2
( 1 )
8( 1)[ 2(1 ) (2 2 )]
rd rd
x y
n s
n s n s s
 
 
 
     
under separate unions and an encompassing union respectively. We get that the
union utilities are higher under an encompassing union than under separate unions
in this situation.
The following proposition is immediate from the above discussion.
PROPOSITION 5 An encompassing labour union increases the utilities of the
unions compared to separate labour unions, irrespective of its effect on
innovation by firm 1.
2.3.5 The effect of an encompassing labour union on social welfare
Finally, we want to see the effects of an encompassing union on social welfare,
which is the sum of the union utilities, the net profits of the final goods producers
and consumer surplus. If firm 1 either innovates or does not innovate irrespective
of the unionisation structure, welfare is higher under an encompassing union
compared to separate unions. Given the technology level, the lower wage under an
encompassing union compared to separate unions helps to create a higher welfare
under the former than the latter unionisation structure.
Now consider the case where firm 1 innovates only under separate unions, i.e.,
when *(2 / ( 2), )s n s  and c nck k k  . We will see that an encompassing
union may reduce welfare in this situation. Due to the complicated welfare
expression, we will consider two numerical examples to show that whether an
encompassing union reduces welfare in this situation depends on the product-
market competition, given by n.
Assume that n=2, *(1/ 2, ( 17 561) / 8)s s    and c nck k k  . We get in
this situation that welfare is higher under “an encompassing labour union and no
innovation” than under “separate labour unions and innovation” even if we
consider maximum welfare under separate unions, which occurs at the cost of
innovation ck . However, if we consider that n=20,
*(1/11, ( 2717 7816809) / 80)s s    and c nck k k  , we get that welfare in
this situation is lower (higher) under “an encompassing labour union and no
innovation” than under “separate labour unions and innovation” for
(1/11,13/100)s ( (13 /100,( 2717 7816809) / 80)s   ) when we consider
minimum welfare under separate unions, which occurs at nck .
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The reason for the above result is as follows. If an encompassing union reduces
innovation, it creates two opposing effects on welfare. On one hand, it tends to
increase welfare by reducing wage. On the other hand, it tends to reduce welfare
by reducing innovation. We have seen that more firms reduce the equilibrium
wage. Since more firms create significantly lower wage under separate unions,
further benefit from an encompassing union due to a lower wage is not significant
if the product-market competition is significant. Hence, if the number of firms and
the technological improvement through innovation are large, the loss from an
encompassing union due to a lower innovation dominates the gain created by the
encompassing union through lower wage, thus creating lower welfare under “an
encompassing labour union and no innovation” compared to “separate labour
unions and innovation”.
However, if the product market is very much concentrated (i.e., n is small), the
gain from an encompassing union due to a lower wage is significant to outweigh
the negative effect of an encompassing union on innovation. In this situation, an
encompassing union increases welfare even if it reduces innovation.
Finally, consider the case where firm 1 innovates only under an encompassing
union, which occurs for *( ,1)s s and nc ck k k  . We get in this situation that
welfare is higher under “an encompassing labour union and innovation” than
under “separate labour unions and no innovation” even if we consider minimum
welfare under an encompassing union, which occurs at the cost of innovation ck .
The positive effects of both lower wage and innovation following an
encompassing union are responsible for this result.
The following result summarises the above discussion.
PROPOSITION 6 If an encompassing labour union reduces innovation compared
to separate labour unions, social welfare may be lower under “an encompassing
labour union and no innovation” than under “separate labour unions and
innovation” if the product market is sufficiently competitive and the technological
improvement through R&D is large.
An encompassing union solves the complements problem but it may reduce
innovation by firm 1. As mentioned above, this trade-off is responsible for the
above result. Since the benefit from an encompassing union due to a lower wage
depends on the number of final goods producers, product-market competition
plays an important role for the above result.
As already mentioned, no innovation under an encompassing union is the
artefact of the binary choice for firm 1’s R&D decision and we consider this
binary choice to prove our point in the simplest way. If we consider a non-binary
choice for firm 1’s R&D decision and firm 1 can choose the extent of
technological improvement, firm 1 would innovate under an encompassing union
but the extent of technological improvement chosen by firm 1 could be lower
under an encompassing union compared to separate unions. Hence, even if we
allow firm 1 to choose the extent of technological improvement, an encompassing
union creates the adverse effect on innovation, which, in turn, may reduce social
welfare compared to separate unions.
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3 Discussion
We now discuss the implications of some of our assumptions.
Like the related literature mentioned in the introduction, we have considered
that labour is the only factor of production. This helped us to compare and
contrast our results with that of the extant literature in a simplest way by showing
the trade-off created by the complements problem and the raising rival’s cost
effect on innovation. However, one can extend the analysis by incorporating non-
labour factors of production. The raising rival’s cost effect shown in our analysis
would remain in this extended model with labour and non-labour factors of
production if the innovation is labour saving but that effect would not occur if
innovation saves the non-labour factors of production. If the production process
involves both labour and non-labour factors of production, firm may also have a
choice regarding the type of innovation, i.e., labour saving and/or non-labour
saving, depending on the labour unionisation structure. We leave this issue for
future research.
To show the trade-off created by the complements problem and the raising rival’s
cost effect on innovation in a simplest way, we assume that innovation allows the
innovator to reduce the use of different types of labours in the same way. Hence,
the innovation is not biased towards any type of worker and creates a neutral
technological progress. This makes the analysis simple by creating symmetric
behaviour of different labour unions. However, it is needless to say that if
innovation reduces the use of different types of labours differently, our main
result showing the adverse effects of an encompassing labour union on innovation
and welfare remain.
Finally, to show the adverse effects of an encompassing labour union on innovation
and welfare, we considered that the unions have full bargaining power in determining
wages. However, it is easy to understand that if the firms have bargaining power, it
will reduce wages and would affect the equilibrium outputs and profits, yet the trade-
off created by the complements problem and the raising rival’s cost effect remain. As
long as the unions have the bargaining power, the complements problem creates a
lower wage under an encompassing union compared to separate unions. Hence, under
no innovation, the profit of firm 1 is higher under an encompassing union compared to
separate unions, reducing firm 1’s benefit from innovation under an encompassing
union. On the other hand, under innovation, firm 1’s profit is lower (higher) under an
encompassing union compared to separate unions if ( )( 1) /s n n   , reducing
(increasing) firm 1’s benefit from innovation under an encompassing union for
( )( 1) /s n n   . These are similar to the effects discussed after Proposition 3. Hence,
even if there is bargaining between the firms and the unions, an encompassing union
reduces (but may increase) the incentive for innovation compared to separate unions if
the technological improvement through innovation is large (small).
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4 Conclusion
While the firms use complementary workers in reality, the existing literature
examining the effects of the labour unionisation structure on innovation
considered only substitutable workers and did not pay attention to complementary
workers. This paper fills this gap in the literature.
We show that cooperation among the labour unions (or an encompassing labour
union) of complementary workers may either increase or decrease a final goods
producer’s incentive for innovation compared to non-cooperation among the
labour unions (or separate labour unions). Although cooperation among the
unions solves the complements problem, it may have an adverse effect on the final
goods producer’s technological improvement. We show that the adverse effect on
the technological improvement may dominate the beneficial wage effect of
cooperation among the unions, thus making the consumers and the society worse
off. While cooperation among the unions makes the workers better off, it may not
make all final goods producers better off. Thus, our results provide new insights
to the literature on labour unionisation structure and innovation, and suggest that
whether the workers are substitutes or complements are important factors to
consider.
Appendix
A.1 The restriction on s to ensure that all final goods producers always hire
workers
We show here that if the final goods producers differ in terms of their technologies,
all final goods producers hire workers under separate and encompassing unions if
2 / ( 2)n s  . If the unions want to charge the wage in a way so that it is not
profitable for all firms to hire workers at that wage, it is easy to understand that the
unions can prevent the non-innovating firms from hiring workers but cannot
prevent only the innovating firm from hiring workers. This happens since the
outputs of the innovating firm are always positive whenever the outputs of the
non-innovating firms are positive, and the unions cannot charge a wage that will
induce only the non-innovating firms to hire workers.
Separate labour unions: First, consider the case of separate labour unions and the
equilibrium with symmetric wages. If the unions want to provide workers only to
the technologically superior final goods producer (i.e., to firm 1, which innovates a
new technology and creates technological difference between the final goods
producers), wages need to be such that it is not profitable for the technologically
inferior non-innovating firms to hire workers. If the unions provide workers to
firm 1 only, the demand for workers is [1 ( )] / 2x y x yq q s s w w    and the
equilibrium wages are , , 1/ 3nc m nc mx yw w s  . The outputs of the non-innovating
firms are zero at these wages if 4 / 5s  . If 4 / 5 s , the equilibrium wages need
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to be   1/ 2(2 )
m m
x yw w s   to prevent the non-innovating firms from hiring
workers. Since   1/ 2(2 )
m m
x yw w s   is the constrained wage, it is immediate that
the equilibrium union utilities are lower from charging the wage
  1/ 2(2 )
m m
x yw w s   than from charging the wage , , 1/ 3nc m nc mx yw w s  .
If the workers are hired only by firm 1 at the wages , , 1/ 3nc m nc mx yw w s  , which
can happen for 4 / 5s  , the equilibrium union utilities are , , 1/18nc m nc mx y   .
We get that, if 2 / ( 2)n s  , , , 1/18nc m nc mx y   are lower than
2 2( 1 ) / 9( 1)[ 2(1 ) (2 2 )]nc ncx y n s n s n s s           , which are the union
utilities when all final goods producers are provided workers, as considered in the
text. Since , , 1/18nc m nc mx y   , i.e., the union utilities under the unconstrained
wages , , 1/ 3nc m nc mx yw w s  , are lower than the union utilities from providing
workers to all final gods producers, it is immediate that if 4 / 5 s and the unions
charge   1/ 2(2 )
m m
x yw w s   to provide workers to only firm 1, the union utilities
are lower from providing workers to only firm 1 than from providing workers to
all final goods producers. Hence, the separate unions provide workers to all final
goods producers for 2 / ( 2)n s  , as considered in the text.
An encompassing labour union: Now consider an encompassing labour union and
the equilibrium with symmetric wages. If the union provides workers to firm 1
only, the demand for workers is [1 ( )] / 2x y x yq q s s w w    and the equilibrium
wages are c, c, 1/ 4m mx yw w s  . The outputs of the non-innovating firms are zero at
these wages if 2 / 3s  . If 2 / 3 s , the equilibrium wages need to be
  1/ 2(2 )
m m
x yw w s   to prevent the non-innovating firms from hiring workers.
Since   1/ 2(2 )
m m
x yw w s   is the constrained wage, it is immediate that the
equilibrium union utility is lower from charging the wage   1/ 2(2 )
m m
x yw w s  
than from charging the wage c, c, 1/ 4m mx yw w s  .
If the workers are hired only by firm 1 at the wages c, c, 1/ 4m mx yw w s  , which
can happen for 2 / 3s  , the equilibrium union utilities are c, c, 1/16m mx y   . We
get that, if 2 / ( 2)n s  , c, c, 1/16m mx y   are lower than
2 2( 1 ) / 58( 1)[ 2(1 ) (2 2 )]c cx y n s n s n s s           , which are the union
utilities when all final goods producers are provided workers, as considered in the
text. Since c, c, 1/16m mx y   , i.e., the union utilities under the unconstrained
wages c, c, 1/ 4m mx yw w s  , are lower than the union utilities from providing
workers to all final goods producers, it is immediate that if 2 / 3 s and the unions
charge   1/ 2(2 )
m m
x yw w s   to provide workers to only firm 1, the union utilities
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are lower from providing workers to only firm 1 than from providing workers to
all final goods producers. Hence, an encompassing labour union provides workers
to all final goods producers for 2 / ( 2)n s  , as considered in the text.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Under separate labour unions, firm 1’s profit under innovation is
22 2
,
1 2
4(1 ) 2 (1 ) (2 2 )
( 1)[ 6(1 ) 3 (2 2 )]
nc rd s n s n s s k
n s n s s

       
        
,
while its profit under no innovation is , 21 1 / 9( 1)
nc nrd n   . Firm 1 innovates if
, ,
1 1
nc rd nc nrd  , which gives the result. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Under an encompassing labour union, firm 1’s profit under innovation is
22 2
c,
1 2
3(1 ) (1 ) (2 2 )
( 1)[ 4(1 ) 2 (2 2 )]
rd s n s n s s k
n s n s s

       
        
,
while its profit under no innovation is c, 21 1 / 4( 1)
nrd n   . Firm 1 innovates if
c, c,
1 1
rd nrd  , which gives the result. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
If firm 1 innovates under both unionisation structures, its profit is
22 2
,
1 2
4(1 ) 2 (1 ) (2 2 )
( 1)[ 6(1 ) 3 (2 2 )]
nc rd s n s n s s k
n s n s s

       
        
under separate labour unions and
22 2
c,
1 2
3(1 ) (1 ) (2 2 )
( 1)[ 4(1 ) 2 (2 2 )]
rd s n s n s s k
n s n s s

       
        
under an encompassing labour union. We get that 1 1( )
nc c   for
(2 / ( 2),( 1) / )s n n n   ( (( 1) / ,1)s n n  ).
If firm 1 innovates under separate and encompassing labour unions, the profit of
firm i, i=2,...,n, is
22 2
2
2(1 ) (2 4 3 )
( 1)[ 6(1 ) 3 (2 2 )]
nc
i
s n s s
n s n s s

     
        
under separate labour unions and
22 2
2
(2 ) (2 3 2 )
( 1)[ 4(1 ) 2 (2 2 )]
c
i
s s n s s
n s n s s

      
        
under an encompassing labour union. We get that nc ci i  for (2 / ( 2),1)s n  .
Q.E.D.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We obtain that ( )nc ck k  for *(2 / ( 2), )s n s  ( *( ,1)s s ), where
* 2 2 4(3 4 7 9 58 49 ) / 4s n n n n n      .
If *(2 / ( 2), )s n s  and c nck k k  , firm 1 innovates only under separate
unions. In this situation, an encompassing union reduces firm 1’s incentive for
innovation compared to separate unions. However, the unionisation structure does
not affect firm 1’s incentive for innovation if either c nck k k  (where firm 1
innovates irrespective of the unionisation structures) or c nck k k  (where firm
1 does not innovate irrespective of the unionisation structure).
If *( ,1)s s and nc ck k k  , firm 1 innovates only under an encompassing
union. In this situation, an encompassing union increases firm 1’s incentive for
innovation compared to separate unions. However, the unionisation structure does
not affect firm 1’s incentive for innovation if either nc ck k k  (where firm 1
innovates irrespective of the unionisation structure) or nc ck k k  (where firm 1
does not innovate irrespective of the unionisation structure). Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
If *(2 / ( 2), )s n s  and ( , )c nck k k , firm 1 innovates only under separate
unions. The total outputs of the final goods producers under “separate labour
unions and innovation by firm 1” and under “an encompassing labour union and
no innovation by firm 1” are
2 2 2
,
2
2 (1 ) 2(1 ) (4 6 3 )
( 1)[ 6(1 ) 3 (2 2 )]
nc rd n s s n s sq
n s n s s
      

     
and
c,
2( 1)
nrd nq
n


respectively. We get that , c,( )ns rd nrdq q  if **(2 / ( 2), )s n s  ( ** *( , )s s s ),
where
2 2 4
** *
2
4 3 3( )2
2 4 3
n n n n
s s
n n
     
  
  
. Q.E.D.
A.7 The case of multiple innovators
We show here that an encompassing labour union may reduce innovation
compared to separate labour unions even if there are multiple innovators. Since the
calculations are straightforward but cumbersome, we skip the mathematical details.
As in the text, we assume that there are n firms in the industry. However, we
now assume that all firms can innovate to improve labour productivities.
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First, consider the case of separate labour unions. If (m – 1) firms invested in
innovation, the mth firm invests in innovation if its equilibrium net profit11 from
innovation (implying that m number of firms invest in innovation) is higher than
its equilibrium profit from no innovation (implying that (m – 1) firms invest in
innovation) if
(A1)
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
( (1 ) ( 3 2 (1 ) 2 ) (1 )(3 ))
9(1 ) ( (1 )(1 (1 ) ))
( (1 ) 2( 1)( 2(1 )) ( 1)( 4 3 ) ) ( ).
9(1 ) ( (1 ) 2( 1)( 1 ) ( 1)(2 ) )
nc
m s n n s s m s n s nsk
n n m s m n s s ms
m m n m m n s m m n s k m
n m m n m m n s m m n s
          
 
       
          

           
We can find that a higher m corresponds with a lower ( )nck m , implying that if the
cost of doing innovation increases, it reduces the number of firms undertaking
innovation under separate unions.
Now consider the case of an encompassing labour union. If (m – 1) firms
invested in innovation, the mth firm invests in innovation if
(A2)
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
( (1 ) ( 2 (1 ) ) (1 )(2 ))
4(1 ) ( (1 )(1 (1 ) ))
( (1 ) ( 1)(2 3(1 )) ( 1)( 3 2 ) ) ( ).
4(1 ) ( (1 ) 2( 1)( 1 ) ( 1)(2 ) )
c
m s n n s s m s s nsk
n n m s m n s s ms
m m n m m n s m m n s k m
n m m n m m n s m m n s
         
 
       
          

           
We can find that a higher m corresponds with a lower ( )ck m , implying that if the
cost of doing innovation increases, it reduces the number of firms undertaking
innovation under an encompassing union.
Evaluating (A1) and (A2) at 1m  and comparing them gives us Proposition 3.
Now we consider other cases.
If ( )nck k n and ( )ck k n , all firms innovate under both unionisation
structures. However, we get that ( ) ( )nc ck n k n , suggesting that if the cost of
doing innovation is such that all firms innovate under an encompassing union, the
incentive for innovation is higher under an encompassing union compared to
separate unions. This happens since the “raising rival’s cost” motive, as discussed
after Proposition 3, does not work in this situation.
Now consider the case where the costs of doing innovation are not small enough
to make innovation by all firms profitable under an encompassing union. Given
expressions (A1) and (A2), we cannot compare ( )nck m and ( )ck m generally.
Hence, we use numerical examples to show that the number of innovating firms
may be lower under an encompassing union if all firms do not find innovation
profitable under an encompassing union.
11 When determining the equilibrium profits, we have considered the corresponding equilibrium
wages.
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As an example, consider that 5n  and 2m  . We get that
2 3 4 5
6 7 8
2 3 4 2
2( 5184 20664 37338 38151 21030 2539
4606 3112 704 )(2)
27(72 168 205 124 40 )
nc
s s s s s
s s sk k
s s s s
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  
  
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and
2 3 4
5 6 7 8
2 3 4 2
(3456 13752 25053 25893 14550
1981 3073 2152 512 )(2) .
12(72 168 205 124 40 )
c
s s s s
s s s sk k
s s s s
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We plot ( 2, 5) ( 2, 5)c nck m n k m n     in Figure 1 and find that
( 2, 5) ( 2, 5)c nck m n k m n     for 0.6 0.9 ( .)s approx  .12
Figure 1: ( 2, 5) ( 2, 5)c nck m n k m n    
If 0.6 0.9 ( .)s approx  and ( 2, 5) ( 2, 5)c nck m n k k m n      , an
encompassing labour union reduces the number of innovating firms compared to
separate labour unions.
It is now easy to understand that if an encompassing labour union reduces the
number of innovators compared to separate labour unions, it may reduce consumer
surplus and welfare than the latter unionisation structure even if it solves the
complementary problem.
12 If there are k innovating and (n – k) non-innovating firms, in an equilibrium with symmetric
wages, the unions provide workers to all firms for [2 ( 1)] / (2 )k n k k n s    . Hence, if
5n  and 2m  , the unions provide workers to all firms for 0.6 s , and we restrict our
attention to 0.6 s .
0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
s
0.010
0.008
0.006
0.004
0.002
0.002
kppknc
21
References
Aghadadashli, H. and C, Wey (2015), “Multiunion Bargaining: Tariff Plurality
and Tariff Competition,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,
171, 666-695.
Calabuig, V. and M. Gonzalez-Maestre (2002), “Union Structure and Incentives
for Innovation,” European Journal of Political Economy, 18, 177-192.
Calmfors, L. and J. Drifill (1988), “Centralisation and Wage Bargaining,” Economic
Policy, 6, 13-61.
Carluccio, J., D. Fougère and E. Gautier (2015), “Trade, Wages and Collective
Bargaining: Evidence from France,” Economic Journal, 125, 803-837.
Flanagan, R. J., 1999, “Macroeconomic Performance and Collective Bargaining: An
International Perspective,” Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 1150-1175.
Gallini, N.T. (1992), “Patent Policy and Costly Imitation,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 23, 52-63.
Gilbert, R. J. and M.L. Katz (2011), “Efficient Division of Profits from Complementary
Innovations,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29, 443-454.
Haucap, J., U. Pauly and C. Wey (2001), “Collective Wage Setting When Wages
Are Generally Binding – An Antitrust Perspective,” International Review of
Law and Economics, 21, 287-307.
Haucap, J. and C. Wey (2004), “Unionisation Structures and Innovation
Incentives,” Economic Journal, 114, C149-C165.
Horn, H. and A. Wolinsky (1988), “Worker Substitutability and Patterns of
Unionisation,” Economic Journal, 98, 484-497.
Kjellberg, A. (2014), “Union Density and Specialist/Professional Unions in
Sweden,” Mimeo, Lund University.
Lamarche, C. (2013), “Industry-wide Work Rules and Productivity: Evidence
from Argentina Union Contract Data,” IZA Journal of Labor & Development, 2
(Article No. 11), 1-25.
Layard R., S. Nickell and R. Jackman (1991), Unemployment, Macroeconomic
Performance and The Labour Market, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Manasakis, C. and E. Petrakis (2009), “Union Structure and Firm’ Incentives For
Cooperative R&D Investments,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 42, 665-693.
Marjit, S. and A. Mukherjee (2008), “International Outsourcing and R&D: Long-Run
Implications for Consumers,” Review of International Economics, 16, 1010-1022.
Mattoo, A., M. Olarreaga and K. Saggi (2004), “Mode of Foreign Entry,
Technology Transfer, and FDI Policy,” Journal of Development Economics, 75,
95-111.
Moene, K. O. and M. Wallerstein (1997), “Pay Inequality,” Journal of Labour
Economics, 15, 403-430.
Mookherjee, D. and D. Ray (1991), “On the Competitive Pressure Created by The
Diffusion of Innovations,” Journal of Economic Theory, 54, 124-147.
Mukherjee, A. (2003), “Does Society Prefer Small Innovation?” Economics
Letters, 78, 301-307.
Mukherjee, A. and E. Pennings (2011), “Unionization Structure, Licensing and
Innovation,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29, 232-241.
22
Ray Chowdhury, P. (1995), “Technological Asymmetry and Joint Product
Development,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13, 23-39.
Salop, S. C. and Scheffman, D. T. (1983), “Raising Rivals’ Cost: Recent
Advances in The Theory of Industrial Structure,” American Economic Review,
73, 267-271.
Salop, S. C. and Scheffman, D. T. (1987), “Cost-raising Strategies,” Journal of
Industrial Economics, 36, 19-34.
Shapiro, C. (2000), “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting,” in: A. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. Stern (eds.), Innovation Policy and the
Economy, Vol. 1, MIT-Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Upmann, T. and J. Müller (2014), “The Structure of Firm-Specific Labour Unions,”
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 170, 336-364.
Venn, D. (2009), “Legislation, Collective Bargaining and Enforcement: Updating
The OECD Employment Protection Indicators,” Working Papers, No. 89,
OECD Social, Employment and Migration.
Williamson, O. E. (1968), “Wage Rates as A Barrier to Entry: The Pennington
Case in Perspective,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82, 85-116.
Arijit Mukherjee
Nottingham University Business
School
Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road,
Nottingham,
NG8 1BB, UK
Fax: +44 (0)115 84 66667
arijit.mukherjee@nottingham.ac.uk
Tien-Der Han
School of Business and Economics
Loughborough University
Loughborough, Leicestershire,
LE11 3TU, UK
t.han2@lboro.ac.uk
